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Educational policy-making in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is still building upon the ambivalences and uncertainties of post-communist transformation. The international support, expertise and discourses – coupled with communist legacies, stalled democratic developments and national discourses – produce unique effects on education in each of these countries. This paper is an attempt to conceptualise educational policy-making (with its disparities between ‘democratised’ discourses and ‘Sovietised’ practices) as a form of emerging governmentality or governmentality-in-the-making on the level of the state, using Ukraine as a case study. Analysing policy-making through the perspective of emerging governmentality brings into focus the genealogy of post-independent reforms, which is (as a part of the technologies of government) threaded into a broader governmental project of restructuring the state and legitimising its rationality. The final empirical part of the paper presents a discourse analysis of selected curriculum choice and assessment policy documents (1999–2003) and embedded in them the complex interplay of internal and external discourses, which work together to construct and justify the emerging governmental rationality of post-communist Ukraine.

Keywords: educational policy-making; emerging governmentality; genealogy of educational reforms; post-communist Ukraine

Introduction

‘Ambivalence’ and ‘uncertainty’ are the terms that have often been used to describe contemporary Ukrainian polity (Wilson 1995, 2000; Riabchuk 2000a, 2000b; Auslund 2003; Way 2003). Political and economic transformations in this linguistically and culturally diverse country of 47 million people have been marked to date, on the one hand, by excessive democratisation and pro-European rhetoric and, on the other hand, by persisting post-communist legacies intertwined with multiple external influences (both from Russia and the EU). Understanding Ukraine’s strong regional divisions is important here, since different parts of the country were dominated by culturally and politically different powers, such as the Habsburg and Romanov empires, the Polish Commonwealth and the Soviet Union (Eastern Ukraine from 1920, Western Ukraine from 1945) (Subtelny 1994; Wilson 1995; Kuzio 2001).

The focus of this paper is educational policy-making in post-communist Ukraine, whereby the nature of socio-political and economic transformations constrained by the weak state’s structure (characterised by lack of robust institutionalised civil society and violations of the rule of law) has contributed to the government’s growing openness and
receptiveness towards Western political and educational discourses. At the same time, however, the practices and institutional cultures of post-communism remain almost unchanged since the Soviet times and create greater disparity between policy declarations and actual practical changes (Wolczuk 2004). External discourses on the level of the state enter a set of complex institutions, traditions, behaviours and legacies of post-communism, where they are further mediated and often used by political and national elites to justify and push their own agenda (Wilson 1995, 2000; Kuzio 1998, 2001; Kuzio, Kravchuk, and D’Anieri 1999; Kuzio and D’Anieri 2002; D’Anieri 2006; cf. Silova 2002).

The following discussion is organised in three parts. The study of educational policymaking in post-communist Ukraine that employs Foucault’s governmentality as its main conceptual tool is introduced in the first part of the paper. Following on from that, the internal context and genealogy of educational reform in post-communist Ukraine are discussed. Finally, the paper offers a discourse analysis of selected policy documents dating back to 1999–2003.

Governmentality as a conceptual tool in policy studies

This paper is based on research in progress, which bridges policy sociology, post-communist research and globalisation studies. The overarching conceptual tool employed in my analysis is Foucault’s governmentality (Foucault 1991), which requires a brief introduction here. In its first historical meaning, governmentality stands for a process started in Western Europe in the late sixteenth century onwards, in which the problem of how to govern a state (as a new form of power) emerged as the result of the transformation of two other types of power: those of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘discipline’. In its second meaning, governmentality refers to the resultant frameworks of governmental apparatuses, procedures, technologies and mechanisms that have the optimisation of population as the object of intervention, made possible through the knowledge of disciplines and apparatuses of security integral to the state. Governmentality in its both meanings stands for various mentalities that make the activities of government (as government of oneself and others) thinkable (Foucault 1991; Dean 1999). Governmentality as a conceptual tool opens up a new area of research, which is neither historical nor sociological per se, because it does not seek the answers to what happened and why. Rather, to operationalise governmentality is:

To adopt a particular point of view which brings certain questions into focus: that dimension of our history composed by the intervention, contestation, operationalisation and transformation of more or less rationalized schemes, programmes, techniques and devices which seek to shape conduct so as to achieve certain ends. (Rose 1999, 20, cited in Fimyar 2008, 14)

Discussion of governmentality has been mainly concerned with Western liberal states, which can be attributed to Foucault’s ‘effect’ (using Burchell, Gordon and Miller’s 1991 title) upon Western theoretical thought. At the same time, governmentality appears to be adaptable to non-Western post-colonial contexts. For example, Tikly (2003, 162) draws on governmentality in the analysis of post-apartheid educational policies in South Africa in an attempt to explain the evolving policy discourses. However, in the post-colonial context, governmentality has a more specific meaning as it stands for the various ways in which power is exercised in societies undergoing regime change, when the gap between the new emerging discourses and old persistent practices is the greatest. Maintaining Foucault’s thesis, education policy in Tikly’s study is defined as the forms of political programme that use technologies of government and are consistent with the underlying rationality of government.
For the purposes of my analysis and following Foucault’s generous invitation to maximise the utility of his conceptual tools, governmentality in the context of post-communist Ukraine will be operationalised as ‘an emerging governmentality’. This is done for two major reasons. First, Foucault maintained that socialism (in contrast to liberalism) lacks the art of government and does not work on rationalising its practices and technologies (Foucault 1991). Secondly, ‘governmentality-in-the-making’, which is semantically very close to ‘emerging governmentality’, was successfully utilised in Tikly’s aforementioned research. Therefore, in the study of policy-making in post-communist Ukraine, ‘emerging governmentality’ is used to delineate the form of political rationality (in the aftermath of political and social change), in which the discursive space has acquired liberal connotations, while the practices and legacies of the previous regime still persist both at the governmental and individual levels. As Tikly (2003, 166) formulates it: ‘governmentality-in-the-making’ consists of complex and often contradictory elements ‘which provide both continuity and discontinuity with what went before’.

Internal context of educational policy-making in post-communist Ukraine

Severe structural, institutional and economic crises, into which Ukraine has been rapidly sinking since 1991, have had major implications for the deteriorating quality of education in comparison to Western countries as well as pre-independent Ukraine (UNDP Report 2001). The widening inequalities between rural and urban schools, mushrooming of private tutoring and non-state universities, widespread bribery and corruption, especially in the access to tertiary education, although existing in Soviet Ukraine, have become deeply rooted practices of the educational landscape in post-independent Ukraine. The system of education in this post-communist country provides an example of emerging governmentality, whereby the desire to transform the system is repeatedly declared by the political leadership, but budgetary constraints, lack of political commitment, expertise and overall strategy make the pace of reform extremely slow. As a result, many commentators still describe the Ukrainian education system as structurally too centralised (International Centre for Policy Studies 2000; Sundakov 2001) and in terms of institutional practices too Soviet (Hromovyy 2004).

The persistence of Soviet legacies in contemporary Ukraine undermines the idea that independence (the result of an uneasy alliance between national communists and national democrats at the time) was in any way a clear-cut departure from the previous regime. On the contrary, independence provided the momentum for communist leaders, to whom Kuzio refers as to ‘national communists’ of the Party of Power, to cling to power in Ukraine for another decade. Regardless of the fact that Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) was formally banned from 1991 to 1993, many of its leaders continued to play major governmental and decision-making roles in the country. However, the ex-communist leadership of the Party of Power was not monolithic and comprised both left- and right-wing tendencies (Kuzio 1998). For ‘pragmatic survival reasons’, the Party of Power borrowed its agenda from the national democratic movement, Rukh, which failed to have a definitive impact on policy direction as a political opposition with a more liberal and reformist platform, despite securing a quarter of the seats in Parliament in the 1990 elections (Dryzek and Holmes 2002, 116). Therefore, the political leadership of the country during the first decade of independence was communist in its essence, nationalistic or rather state-centrist in its declarations and ‘undecided’ in terms of its (pro-Western or pro-Russian) strategy. This coincided with the formation of a new elite group (oligarchs), who used opaque privatisation mechanisms and informal contacts with the communists in power to gain access to extremely cheap state properties and seize control of the country’s economic assets. As a result, the communist
elite merged with the new oligarchs, and the communist state turned into an oligarchy (Kuzio and D’Anieri 1998; Dean 2000). In the second decade after independence, the semi-authoritarian post-communist Ukrainian leadership (Way 2003; Polokhalo 2004) has devised new mechanisms for securing control and power over strategic sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, in politics ‘the old boys’ network’ (Kuzio 1998) has advanced the practices of ‘faking democracy’ (Wilson 2005), whereby a ‘dysfunctional’ state (Darden 2001) uses ‘blackmail’ against political opponents and their supporters (Riabchuk 2004) as one of the tools of political/economic domination and state governance.

‘Faking democracy’ is a useful concept in understanding why the emerging governmentality of post-communist politics did not evolve into either a strong authoritarian or meaningful democratic type, but instead developed an ‘art of political technology’ which combined the political cascade of democracy (elections, separation of powers) with the political tactics of authoritarianism (penalties, surveillance, censorship). Political technologies of ‘faking democracy’, aimed at securing at any cost the electoral victory of pro-governmental parties and candidates, make use of spin doctors and virtual opposition parties, mass media censorship and the established framework of democratic institutions, the rules of which are completely disregarded. Apart from the use of sophisticated political technologies, Way (2005) attributes the inability of the communist incumbents to enforce authoritarian rule in Ukraine to the existing form of political competition – pluralism by default – specific to a weak post-communist state with fragmented unconsolidated elites – when old elites ‘are experienced enough to resist the change and [the new elites] are too inexperienced to bring it about’ (Motyl 1995, 113).

Studies on political decision-making in Ukraine view policy-making as the result of a complex interplay between internal and external factors, which include but are not limited to Soviet legacies, spontaneous adaptations of the ‘travelling’ policies driven by a deliberate international policy action and situational changes of ideology of political elites (Sundakov 2001, 7). It is important to note that in Ukraine national democrats were never given a share of power until 2004, while the ruling post-communist elite always managed to adjust its slogans ‘to the requirements of the moment, becoming a kind of mirror of social attitudes, their populist mediator and mouthpiece’ (Polokhalo 1995, 154). However, the populist slogans have been translated into policy directives with a great degree of distortion – if at all – not only because of the structural and financial constrains, but also because the implementation and monitoring of the existing policies has been highly selective and unsystematic. This is also partly due to the existing system of government in Ukraine, which is characterised by the duplication of authority, whereby various branches of government produce a large number of ‘quasi-legislative’ policy documents, which are poorly coordinated, and their implementation is hardly ever monitored (Sundakov 2001, 10). This is how Kuzio and D’Anieri (2002, 18) summarises this common practice: ‘All CIS states – Ukraine included – have a penchant for drafting long documents that are then ignored or only partially fulfilled. These are more akin to letters of intent than contractual obligations’.

At the policy formation stage, educational policies are initiated without prior public consultations or piloting (the only exception being the external testing of school graduates reform initiated by the International Renaissance Foundation Ukraine). At the stage of implementation, the policies are not monitored, but a ‘control’ over the policy process is undertaken. However, the ‘control’ objectives are to test the policy procedure but not the policy outcomes. This leads to chaotic administration of the policy process, based on a ‘fire-fighting’ approach, when the focus of government is on immediate problems with little capacity for sustained policy-making (Krawchenko 1997, 12; International Centre for Policy Studies 2000; Fimyar 2008, 13). Therefore, the emerging governmentality of educational policy-
making, as well as political decision-making in general, has been marked to date by persistent legacies of the previous regime, on the one hand, and extensive external advice, on the other.

Chaotic administration of policy-making impacts the predominantly negative perception of policies by practitioners, because it creates the wide gap of misunderstanding and mistrust between governmental officials and educators. Although both groups share concerns about the quality of education, the latter are preoccupied with reform rhetoric and initiate reforms with the minimal budget spendings, while the former consider the lack of financial outlay to be the main obstacle to the successful implementation of reforms (Crighton 2002). The following examples will demonstrate that in post-independent Ukraine, as in other post-communist countries, the changes pushed by the state policy directives were often not straightforward and reflect the complexities, contradictions and ambivalences of the post-communist era (Wanner 1998, 79).

**Genealogy of educational reforms in Ukraine (1991-present)**

Maintaining the governmentality thesis, the focus of the analysis now turns to genealogy of educational reforms in Ukraine. In this regard, Crighton’s categorisation (2002) makes a fine point of departure for our discussion. However, Crighton refers to a decade of educational developments in post-communist countries as ‘stages’. Yet, to say that education policies in the countries in question go through stages is to imply that the balance of power between, for example, the Ministry of Education and the external actors or civil society is changing. However, this is not the case in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whereby the rigid centralised structure of the education system does not allow shifting the locus of power over initiation of education reform either to external agencies or to internal think tanks. Therefore, in the discussion of reform initiatives in Ukraine, ‘genealogy’ will be used to more adequately describe the shifts of ‘governmental gaze’ from different educational ‘problems’ which have been articulated by the Ministry since 1991. Crighton’s categorisation presented in Table 1 situates the education policy initiatives in Ukraine within the broader post-communist context and provides a comparative perspective to my analysis.

In the above overview of educational policy-making in post-communist Ukraine, six major directions of educational reform are distinguished. Three policy initiatives will be explained in more detail here because they are crucial for understanding the emergent governmentality of post-communist Ukraine. The first reform that triggered the most controversy (because of strong regional differences in Ukraine) was the changing of the language of instruction in schools from mostly Russian to Ukrainian. While in the 1991–92 academic year, 49% of students were taught in Ukrainian and 50% in Russian, by 2000–01 these figures had changed to 70 and 29%, respectively (Razumkov Centre 2002, 8). This wave of *Ukrainisation* of schools generated various responses from the Russian-speaking population and provoked considerable criticisms in the Russophone regions (Arel 1995, 172). According to Janmaat (2000, 63), the Ministry of Education deliberately adopted an administrative technique designed to coerce a large group of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east and the south to send their children to schools using Ukrainian as the language of instruction. The Ministry of Education, propagating a freedom-of-choice argument, announced that Russian schools were to establish Ukrainian classes with 8–10 children as a minimum number of students. Given the teacher–student ratio of 1:30 (in urban schools), the opportunity to enrol children in a Ukrainian class was highly attractive. A further powerful incentive for parents was the fact that in tertiary education the right to choose the language of instruction was phased out, and gradually higher education institutions were obliged to switch to the Ukrainian language.
Table 1. Genealogy of educational reform in post-communist Ukraine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of reform in CIS (adapted from Crighton 2002)</th>
<th>Genealogy of educational reforms: the case of Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The first stage:</strong></td>
<td>1991–1993 reforms – <em>'creating new subjects and actors'</em>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Is characterised by ‘the initial euphoria about new-found freedoms’</td>
<td>● Creating new structural units of national ‘expertise’ (e.g. National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Policies are aimed at re-establishing educational traditions and structures that existed before the imposition of external communist domination</td>
<td>● Providing legislative framework for establishing private educational institutionsb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Partial devolution of financial responsibilities to local government resulting in immense cuts of funding for the educational sector</td>
<td><strong>1993–1995 reforms – ‘putting new accents in history, ideology and language use’:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Restructuring the curriculum of the humanities, depoliticising the system of education and ridding it of ‘Soviet’ ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Introducing the official post-independent history narrative into the curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Changing from mainly Russian to Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1995–1999 reforms – ‘reacting to hyperinflation: shifting financial responsibility to local budgets’:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● A period of ‘stagnation’ or discontinuity was caused by the four-fold reduction in the education budget (UNDP Programme Report 2001, 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The reforms initiated the transferral of budget burdens from national to local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● The President and his administration took charge of the reforms aimed at restructuring the system of vocational education and developing a network of higher education institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The second stage:</strong></td>
<td>1999–2001 reforms – <em>‘devising technologies of government and restructuring education’</em>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Is targeted at gaining national leadership of educational reform and achieving coherence among multiple initiatives</td>
<td>● Ratifying socio-political programmes which stipulate and legitimise technologies of government (e.g. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 1993, 2004; President of Ukraine 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The involvement of external advice tends to be the greatest during this stage</td>
<td>● The Parliament adopted The Law on General Secondary Education (LGSE) in 1999. Together with The Law on Education (LE) and The National Doctrine of Education (NDE), it envisages significant changes in the structure, duration, curriculum and assessment policies in general secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● The dominant focus is on the top-down implementation rather than on practical changes at the classroom and school levels</td>
<td>● In 2001, The Programme for General Secondary Education (PGSE) initiated a 12-Year Reform Plan (MESU and Academy of Pedagogical Science of Ukraine 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages of reform in CIS (adapted from Crighton 2002)</td>
<td>Genealogy of educational reforms: the case of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The third stage:</strong></td>
<td>2001 – present reform: ‘creating audit cultures and fighting corruption’:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● At the governmental level, discourses about quality education are at the centre of the reform</td>
<td>● From 2001 external testing of school graduates (standardised examinations) was piloted regionally by the International Renaissance Foundation (Soros Foundation Ukraine). In 2007, the reform was implemented nationally under the control of the Ministry (Hrynevych 2002, MESU 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, Lokshyna 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● At the level of schools, there is a 'reform fatigue' resulting from a chronic lack of resources</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: 
^a In Ukraine the development of private sector education was legislatively supported together with changing the status of some general secondary schools into gymnasia or lyceums, a status they had before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. 
^b Razumkov Centre 2002; interview with the former Minister of Education 2007.
The second reform that initiated major structural changes in secondary level education in Ukraine is a 12-year Reform Plan, which stipulates that the period spent in primary, secondary and upper-secondary education will be four, five and three years, thus prolonging the length of general secondary schooling from 10 to 12 years. The school-leaving age will be raised from 16 to 18 respectively, and school-starting age will be six. Important elements of the reform are the compulsory introduction of foreign language training at primary school (English, German, French or Spanish) and a second foreign language in general secondary education. The reform is expected to be completed by 2012 and is known as the 12-year School Reform Plan. The policy brings changes into the assessment criteria, widens the grading scale from 5-12 points, promotes competencies discourse in education and introduces specialised training or ‘profiles’ in upper secondary education (Kabachynka 2001). Alongside these structural reforms, discourses about ‘active pedagogy’, ‘individualisation’ and ‘democratisation’ have been central issues of the policy discourses (UNDP Report 2001). State officials claim that the rationale behind the new education policy is the ‘aligning of Ukrainian education with education in other European countries’ (Kremin 2003, MESU 2006).

The third crucial reform is the assessment policy reform launched in 1999. Prior to that reform, Ukraine had a form of school-leaving examination that had been left unchanged from the Soviet period, when centrally set examinations (in either written or oral form) were administered and marked internally by each school (West and Crighton 1999). According to the new externally funded policy, high school graduates (11th form) who are prospective university students are no longer examined at their own schools and by their own teachers. Instead, high school graduates from each region (initially voluntarily and now according to the quotas set by the Ministry) are required to attend the nearest testing centres on a particular day (from May to June) to take a standardised test in designated subjects, with the students’ names being coded. The universities, colleges and polytechnics were initially encouraged (and are currently obliged) to abandon entrance exams but on a competitive basis accept the certified results of the external testing as an entry requirement to tertiary education. For several years, a hybrid system of school-leaving exams existed in Ukrainian secondary education, whereby external testing was carried out on a voluntary basis, yet schools could still administer their own exams. The driving force behind the new policy continues to be the discourses of fighting corruption and bribery in the competition for university places, fairness and transparency of examinations and equality of educational opportunity. Due to numerous strategic, technical and informational issues, the reform was perceived differently by individual schools, localities and regions. It received various, sometimes opposite, responses from students, parents, teachers, policy-makers, the representatives of international foundations (primarily the International Renaissance Foundation) and the population at large (Hrynevych 2002; Kremin 2003; Lokshyna 2003; Nosareva 2003; Semyvolos 2003b; Bazhal 2005; Hatash 2005; Petriv 2005; Rakov 2005; Usatenko 2005; Halkovska 2006).

The above cursory analysis of the genealogy of educational reform in post-communist Ukraine suggests that hitherto, at the national level, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science has acted as a monopolistic policy-player. The picture is somewhat different when analysing internationally funded policy initiatives such as external testing. However in 2007, when this reform was due to be implemented nationally, the Ministry took over the administration and funding of the reform.

**Discourse analysis of the selected policy documents (1999–2003)**

The following analysis presents the findings of a discourse analysis of selected policy documents (1999–2003), which make an interesting case for emerging governmentality in
post-communist Ukraine. The first document is *The law on general secondary education* (1999) adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament and signed by the former President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. Two other policy documents are *The directive on the introduction of a 12-point grading scale of students’ achievements in general secondary education* (2000) and *The letter on discussing the draft of the concept of specialised education in upper secondary schools* (2003). The argument behind the selection of these particular documents is that they marked the beginning of the on-going 12-year Reform of Ukrainian education. The documents are treated as a whole unit and as ‘cultural and ideological artefacts’ (Burton and Carlen 1979, cited in Codd 1988, 243). Through deconstruction approach, which Wilson (2000, 3) calls an ‘ugly but fashionable’ word, I unravel the dominant and competing discourses embedded in policy documents and connect them to broad socio-political context and the theoretical framework of the study.

**The discourse of educational ‘renewal’ administered by the system of ‘old’ centralised practices**

The analysis begins with the explicit recognition of the particular historical and political context of educational policy-making in post-communist Ukraine presented earlier in the paper. The legitimacy of the policy documents under discussion is based on the principles of ‘following the provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Ukrainian Education Law, other legislative acts and international treaties approved by the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian Parliament]’ (No. 651-XIV, 1).

The first overarching global discourse of educational democratisation has been identified. Democratisation discourse here is linked to and expressed through the personalisation and individualisation of education, as opposed to an emphasis on collectivism in Soviet education. For example, one of the ‘objectives of Ukrainian legislation on general secondary education’ (No. 651-XIV, 1–2) is to ensure the right of citizens to avail themselves freely of a complete general secondary education. The document also maintains that Ukrainian education is non-discriminatory:

> Ukrainian citizens regardless of race, skin colour, political, religious and other convictions, gender, ethnic or social background, status, place of residence, language or other characteristics, shall be guaranteed the free availability of a complete secondary education. (No. 651-XIV, 3)

The democratisation discourse in Ukrainian policy-making is articulated as a discourse of educational renewal aimed at establishing the new values and goals of post-communist education. New values of individualisation in education are emphasised in all the documents in repetitive phrases such as: ‘his/her talents’ (No. 651-XIV, 3), ‘his/her skills’ (No. 651-XIV, 3), ‘his/her abilities’ (No. 428/48, 1). Democratisation discourse is linked to the idea of building a new independent state, i.e. a nation- and state-building discourse, which requires new values and approaches in education. Thus, educational renewal becomes another buzz-word, through which policy-makers justify, promote and impose the new understanding and meaning of education for new times. In line with the educational ‘renewal’ discourse, Ukrainian education is:

> Aimed at the comprehensive development of a personality, [and] based on universal human values and the principles of a scientific approach, multiculturalism, humanism, democracy, civic consciousness, mutual respect between nations and ethnic groups, for the interest of the individual, family, society and state. (No. 651-XIV,)

Applying the governmentality concept here one can see how national policy-actors make use of Foucauldian ‘technologies of the self’ and ‘governance of the soul’ principles in the
construction of new governance or emerging governmentality in post-communist Ukraine. In the above citation, the interests of the individual are given apparent priority over the interests of the state; yet in Article 5 of the same document, concerning the tasks of education, ‘the fulfilment of the requirements of the State standard of general secondary education’ (Provision 3 of Article 5) is given priority over ‘the formation of respectful attitude to the family’, which is moved to the end of the paragraph (Provision 6 of Article 5).

However, there is a tension in these documents between the democratisation discourse and the rhetoric of subordination and hierarchy. In this respect, No. 651-XIV is the key document, which argues for the imposition of a highly centralised educational hierarchy. It strongly maintains that this ‘old’ (that is centralised) form of educational control and management could be an effective means for promoting the development of independent, free individuals. However, the conflict between hierarchy and democracy is rationalised, and the centralised vertical paradigm of decision-making is justified as the effective mechanism for managing educational reform. This line of thought makes centralisation a positive and necessary aspect of policy-making in a large and diverse country like Ukraine.

The intended readership of the documents is not explicitly specified, apart from the letters which are addressed to ‘the Ministry of Education of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kyiv and Sevastopol City Administrations and Regional In-Service Teacher Training Institutes’, who are obliged to disseminate the message of the documents among their administrators and educators. Without directly appealing to the public, Law No. 651-XIV defines various rights and responsibilities of parents. The reason for this might be the fact that policy-makers were more concerned with the question of from whom the document originates than to whom it speaks.

The reference to the audience is not the only thing left out from the documents. For example, Law No. 651-XIV also silences reflection on social problems and their relation to education. Instead the Law presents social reality outside the schools as unproblematic, non-discriminatory and based on ‘respect for the Constitution and state symbols’, ‘the rights and freedoms of the individual’, and his/her ‘dignity and liability under the law’ (No. 651-XIV, 3–7). Meanwhile, such social realities as the high level of youth unemployment, poverty and social exclusion do not appear in the model of society ‘constructed’ by the policy-makers. Similarly, no link between school and further employment opportunities is mentioned anywhere in the document. Nowhere in the text can indications of interaction between education and the wider social system be found. Rather, education is conceptualised as an isolated and closed model. Only four times in the document are connections specified on the governmental level between the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health (No. 651-XIV, 10). This implies that decision-making in education is the exclusive concern of government bureaucrats and ‘power over education’, and consequently ‘over life’, is deeply entrenched in the executive branch of government. Moreover, it suggests that by preserving the existing balance of power and the regimes of truth the smooth, speedy, positive outcomes of reforms will be safeguarded and guaranteed. In other words, emerging governmentality strongly articulates a centralising discourse on governance and not yet the governance of the soul or self-governance, which are features of the art of government in advanced liberal democracies.

**Subordination: rhetoric and practice**

The conflict between democracy and hierarchy is central to the deconstruction of document No. 651-XIV. The subordination discourse here promotes and maintains the hierarchical balance of power between the Ministry of Education and other participants in the policy
process. Various discursive constructions employed in policy documents justify the status and powers of the central Ministerial authorities in taking, administering (controlling) and implementing policy decisions.

To give another example of the strongly centralised discourse on governance, in one of the policy texts the Ministry of Education has acquired the formal status of ‘the specifically authorised central body of the executive branch of power in the area of general secondary education’ (No. 651-XIV, 24), the many absolute and unquestionable prerogatives of which range from determining:

the perspective of development of the general secondary education system, making decisions on innovations in the system of general secondary education, coordinating and controlling these innovations, [to] ensuring the preparation and publication of school text books [and] approving the standards of mandatory educational resources. (No. 651-XIV, 25)

Paradoxically enough under these strict regimes of subordination, the Law states that the Ministry shall ‘encourage education employees’ (No. 651-XIV, 25), yet the form of encouragement is not spelt out, arguably because the imposed discourse of hierarchy does not allow space for the autonomous personal and professional development of teachers. The construction of a subordination discourse is facilitated throughout the document by such language devices as the use of the imperative, the prevalent use of modal verbs (expressing necessity and obligation) like ‘shall’ or ‘may not’, and the frequent use of authoritative phrases such as ‘in the manner established by the Ministry’, ‘approved by the Ministry’, ‘determined by the Ministry’, ‘agreed upon with the Ministry’, ‘according to the recommendation/resolution of the Ministry’ and ‘provided for by the Ministry’. The overuse of nouns such as ‘determination’, ‘compliance’ and ‘pursuance’ is similarly aimed at the perpetuation and strengthening of the subordination discourse.

**Counter discourses: ‘limited choice and autonomy’ and international cooperation**

The emergence of an alternative to the subordination discourse can, however, be traced in the formation of counter discourses of ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’, which are the examples of discontinuity with the rhetoric and practices of Soviet policy-making. This is reminiscent of Tikly’s (2003) claim that governmentality-in-the-making builds upon the contradictions between the legacies of previous political regimes and emergent regimes. Thus, the verb ‘may’ found in No. 651-XIV several times, indicating some room for choice and autonomy, is at odds with the command-administrational repertoire of the whole document. The document maintains: ‘A comprehensive educational institution carrying out innovative activities may possess the status of an experimental institution’ (No. 651-XIV, 4).

However, again the possible prospects for institutional autonomy are overshadowed by the requirements of strict subordination and surveillance. The document continues:

The status of an experimental institution shall not change the subordination, type and form of ownership of a comprehensive educational institution. Regulation of the experimental comprehensive educational institution shall be approved by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. (No. 651-XIV, 4)

In the above example, the rights of educational institutions to decide on matters of institutional autonomy are not addressed and remain silent through the document. However, among some of the controlled freedoms of secondary schools is the right to establish ‘classes (groups) for the in-depth study of some disciplines’ on the basis of higher educational institutions
This is the only reference in the document to the pressing social demand for diversifying the curriculum and introducing choice. However, the phrase is constructed in such a way that it does not (yet) admit the right of students or parents to choose disciplines. This example suggests that the governmental rationality of post-communism constructs and perpetuates the image of a paternalistic state, whereby government (in this case the Ministry) decides what is best for its citizens.

In this regard, it is not surprising that a large section of No. 651-XIV is devoted to the provisions that stipulate the Ministry’s monopoly over curriculum and the State standard of education. It is re-emphasised that compliance with the requirements of the State standard is ‘mandatory’ and ‘the contents and volume of the State standard of general secondary education may not be amended by other bodies of the executive branch of power’ (No. 651-XIV, 20–22). The use of the singular form of the noun ‘standard’ is an additional evidence of the state’s inflexibility to publicly discuss policy options and an attempt to impose the desired reading of the policy text.

Global discourse of competencies: the local discourse of competence-based assessment versus knowledge-based assessment

The analysis now turns to the discourse of competencies embedded in the document No. 428/48, which is The directive on the introduction of 12-point grading scale of students’ achievements in general secondary education (2000). As the title implies, this policy document stipulates the introduction of a new grading scale. Structurally, the document has two parts: the main text, which is one page long, and an appendix, which is five pages long. However, what is not defined in the title but eagerly advocated in the document is a new competence-based approach to assessment. This policy document may also be read as an attempt to establish closer links between education and the demands of the job market with its emphasis on skills and competencies (which are knowledge in use) rather than reproductive knowledge.

‘Competencies’ is a new (and I would argue externally influenced) discourse in Ukrainian education, which has a distinct EU rather than Russian character. For example, the external impact on the formation of a competencies discourse in Ukrainian education can be traced back to the Council of Europe approaches to the concept of competencies (DeSeCo 2002), to the International Board of Standards for Training, Performance and Instruction (IBSTPI) (Spector 2000) and to the input of the 2001 Lisbon Conference (OECD 2000).

From the national perspective, the content of the policy No. 428/48 is legitimised on the basis of The law on education (1991) and The law on general secondary education (1999) and the resolution of the Ukrainian Board of Ministry of Education and Science of 17 August 2000. Noteworthy on the first page of the document are the reference numbers (1060-12) and (651-14) just below the names of other policy papers to which this directive relates. These are the numbers of policy documents in the Ministerial archive, which are cited to give an impression that the proposed policy changes are a logical, systematic well-conceived policy option and a rational continuation of older policies. However, this is debunked by careful scrutiny, reiterating the assumption that emerging governmentality is building upon contradictions between new and old practice, technologies and regimes of truth.

The document starts by setting out the objectives for the introduction of changes in assessment practices. In particular, it is stated that the shift in assessment practice is aimed at the:
Humanisation of education, at a methodological reorientation from a more fact-oriented form of education to a more individualised form of education, introducing an individualised approach and improving the quality and objectivity of assessment. (No. 428/48, 1)

At first, it may seem that this resonates with the personalised learning approach currently advocated in the UK, yet the individualised approach is not a new concept in Ukrainian education. Back in 1969, the Soviet-Ukrainian educator Sukhomlinsky (drawing heavily on Marxist-Leninist ideology) argued for a personalised and individual approach to students. The stress on humanisation and individualisation of education makes No. 428/48 sound radically different to the Law No. 651-XIV. However, the shift of focus from the Ministry of Education to the individual learner is textual and partly rhetorical, which again may signify greater external influences on governmental policy-makers rather than a major departure from Soviet-style policy practices.

The hasty way in which the new discourse of assessment was constructed can be demonstrated by two examples. First, the document affirms that the proposed assessment criteria are temporary (No. 428/48, 1). Secondly, the major part of the main body of the document designates the responsibilities of two Ministerial officials and six scholars from the Ukrainian Academy of Educational Science ‘to complete the elaboration of the assessment criteria (due on 1 October 2000)’ and ‘to hold teacher training seminars on the psychological, didactic and methodological provision of a new assessment policy from September to December 2000’ (No. 428/48, 2). All policy documents at that time were adopted without prior public discussion, but the haste with which this particular policy was approved seemed to be extreme. The inadequacies of post-communist policy-making are partly to blame for this. Sundakov sees the cause of this inefficiency in the lack of national expertise and the legacies of the Soviet system, with its rigid, hierarchically centralised governmental decision-making machinery that does not recognise initiative, dialogue culture and public engagement (Sundakov 2001). At the same time, the fact that this policy document is provisional and open to amendments may signify the discontinuity with the practices of the Soviet regime.

Globalisation discourse as an agent of the educational change

The appendix of No. 428/48 is mostly descriptive and starts with a rationale and advocacy for the proposed changes. The agent for change is constructed as a global transnational body of influences that exert pressure for change in the approach to assessment. These global influences, which are ‘dynamic’ and ‘modern’, are represented as challenges that call for redefining the role and approaches to education and assessment. It is stated that for the contemporary globalised world ‘the sum of knowledge and skills do not constitute the goal of education any more’ (No. 428/48, 2). This claim can also be interpreted as ministerial self-criticism, showing a degree of reflection on the previous approaches to education and learning, which with their focus on memorisation and drilling did not differ significantly from the Soviet system. Introducing competencies as re-conceptualised goals of education ‘for a new world’ is perceived as a response to the demands and challenges of a globalised world.

However, the definition of competencies, given later in the document, is vague and leaves space for ambiguity, partly because it explains what competencies are not rather than what they are. For example, the reader is presented with the statement that ‘competencies are not the sum of knowledge, are not skills, are not abilities’. The second part of the definition appears to partially contradict the first one as it maintains that ‘competencies belong to the sphere of abilities, because abilities are competencies in action’ (No. 428/48, 2). Note here that they are not ‘abilities’ in themselves, but ‘belong to the sphere of abilities’. Having
confused the reader as to whether competencies are abilities, or whether abilities are not competencies, the definition tries to rehabilitate its logic and states that ‘the competencies denote a general ability based on knowledge, experience, values and skills gained in the process of learning’ (No. 428/48, 2). These contradictions in the proposed official definition are explained by Codd’s claim that each policy text ‘masks the contradictions and incoherence of the ideology’ and ‘implicit critique of its own values’ (1988, 245).

The key competencies apparently called for by a globalised world, from the policy-makers’ perspective, are:

- citizenship skills,
- multicultural skills,
- literacy,
- ICT/IT skills [and]
- life-long learning skills. (No. 428/48, 2–3)

However, the suggested list of competencies tends to be rather general and the categories proposed are incomplete. What I mean by this is, when scrutinised, these categories of competencies tend to belong of a larger group of abilities. Alternatively, it would be more constructive to delineate the areas of competencies along the lines of subject-matter competencies, social, personal, strategic and other competencies, and then match the proposed sub-competencies to the group. This would make it possible to recognise (within the discourse) that the competencies concept is more complex than is presented, that it is open to multiple interpretations and is not as straightforward as suggested in this policy paper. There are, for example, crucially important but unexamined differences between approaches which specify ‘competencies’ as narrow behavioural, measurable performances and those which define ‘competence’ in terms of complex inter-relationships between understanding and skills (Westera 2001, 75–88). Although, in fact, multiple definitions of competencies are inevitable, No. 428/48 suppresses this discussion, which is a mere precaution to avoid the multiplicity of readings. Policy-makers achieve this through the repetitive articulation of the official definition in the supporting policy documents (letters, instructions and regulations, as well as in mass media) issued after No. 428/48. This is one of many examples of policy-makers’ efforts to impose ‘one correct’ understanding of an issue and adopt ‘one best’ course of action, which more often than not will be passively accepted by practitioners. The problem of public non-involvement in the policy process can again be attributed to the Soviet legacy, which for a number of decades suppressed questioning the values, meanings and understanding imposed by the authorities. This was accomplished through various technologies and mechanisms of power (as attributes of colonial governmentality) including horizontal and vertical surveillance and policing of the population sustained by a system of rewards and punishments (Dean 1999).

Having justified the reorientation of education goals from knowledge accumulation to the formation of competencies, policy paper No. 428/48 sets new assessment criteria, which I explain through comparison between the old (out-dated and inappropriate) four-point grading scale and new (up-to-date and improved) 12-point grading scale. This dichotomy is summarised in Table 2.

The proposed new assessment system, on the one hand, positive in its aspiration to affirm the individual approach, can signify a ‘progressive turn’ in Ukrainian education aimed at minimising the student’s stress level in relation to assessment and thereby motivating students to achieve higher grades. However, this can also be seen as a mere terminological change, which does not impact educational quality. In other words, this policy works to shift
attention from the discourse of low achievement to the discourse of ‘positive’ achievement. For example, according to the ‘old’ four-point grading scale, students receiving grade ‘2’ had to repeat the year and the work of schools was evaluated by the number (percentage) of students with the highest and lowest grades. In contrast, the new assessment system suggests that all students with whatever grades are positive achievers. It seems that the policy aims to censor the use of the concept ‘low-achievement’ by educators and argues for an improved vision of the Ukrainian system of education, where all students receive positive grades and, consequently, the quality of education increases to 100%. The implications of this discussion are far-reaching. The policy-makers, by changing the terminology, turn the readers’ attention from the highly controversial agenda of quality of education to a discourse of assessment criteria that allow all students to ‘achieve’. The likely reason for this is economic. Ukrainian assessment reform did not require an increase in financial provision and investment in education in contrast to reforms aimed at increasing the quality of education.

Although policy-makers have utilised every opportunity to give the impression that the criteria are thoroughly elaborated, these criteria have a number of ambiguities and are open to multiple interpretations. In general, the scale is based upon whether students can/cannot reproduce the material (memory), work with/without a teacher (autonomy), can/cannot use the knowledge in new environments (flexibility) and acquire learning to learn skills (life-long learning skills and creativity). It is highly doubtful, however, that such singular generalised grading objectives are appropriate for each subject. More specific grading criteria for particular subjects were elaborated by the Ministry several months later (see http://www.mon.gov.ua). Moreover, the borders between the grades from the same level, for example, 1,2,3 (elementary) or 4,5,6 (average) hugely overlap. This fact has caused a lot of confusion among students, teachers and parents (Panich 2001; Kabachynska 2001). Although an analysis of the implementation of this policy is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that the approval and top-down imposition of the new assessment policy was unexpected for educators and parents and met with resistance in the majority of schools (Semyvolos 2003a). However, lacking the ability to channel dissatisfaction with the

| Table 2. The argument for introducing the 12-point grading system. |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Characteristics:        | 4-point grading system | 12-point grading system |
| Grades range:           | 2, 3, 4, 5       | 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 |
| Structure:              | Four grades: 2,3 – negative; 4,5 – positive | Four levels: 1,2,3 – elementary; 4,5,6 – average; 7,8,9 – sufficient; 10,11,12 – high |
| Objectives:             | Control          | Control, educational, diagnostic, upbringing (in Ukraine upbringing is used along with education in supplying a moral and citizenship aspect of education) |
| Checks:                 | Number of mistakes | Level of progress, achievements |
| Weakness/strength:      | Do not motivate individuals to improve grades | Offers an opportunity to pass the test/exam again |
| Arguments:              | Students with overall ‘2’ grades have to repeat the academic year | All students with any grades are ‘positive’ achievers and are transferred to the next grade/level of education |

‘Undemocratic’ (repressive)/ ‘Democratic’ (encouraging, motivating)
policy, bottom-up resistance found its expression mostly through so-called ‘kitchen’ talks (the form of public reaction to unpopular policy decisions which are criticised in a close circle of family or friends) and occasional emotionally coloured media reportage. Neither influenced the imposition of the new policy, because policy-makers are aware of and become indifferent or indeed immune to constant public discontent with governmental policies (Panich 2001, Mosienko 2004). As a result, the lack of formal channels for feedback or complaint made the policy ‘an object for passive consumption’ (Belsey 1980, 104, cited in Codd 1988, 246) as it often was during the Soviet period.

**Europeanisation discourse as a leitmotiv for specialised education in upper secondary schools: prospects for curriculum choice**

The discourse of specialised education, embedded in No. 428/55 The letter on discussing the draft of the concept of specialised education in upper secondary schools (2003), addresses the problem of the growing societal demand for a more vocationally oriented curriculum and the introduction of early specialisation in upper secondary schools, which gives the student an opportunity to choose disciplines most closely related to their future career choice. The policy change advocated in this document can be linked to the external discourses of Europeanisation and individualisation of education. The rationale for an introduction of early elective specialisations is:

> [T]o create favourable conditions for the development of individual abilities, interests and the needs of students, and for the students’ orientation towards the future professional activity of their choice; and to realise the principle of an individual approach in education which considerably extends the opportunities for a student to create his/her own educational trajectory. (No. 428/55, 1)

Individualisation of education and especially the introduction of ‘choice’ as a part of technologies of the self reflect external influences upon national policy-making. The policy is presented as a synthesis of both external and national ‘best practices’ because, as the document maintains, the initiative ‘is developed taking into account domestic and foreign experience of the organisation of specialised education in upper secondary schools’ (No. 428/55, 1). The following statement indicates that the locus of external pressures has a clear European dimension and, under these conditions, Ukraine is striving to catch up with ‘the world’s leading countries’:

> [T]he development of the world and, in particular, the European educational space requires Ukrainian education to react adequately to the processes of reformation in general secondary schools that are taking place in the world’s leading countries. (No. 428/55, 1)

The suggested subject areas of specialisation are presented in Table 3.

In an attempt to justify the proposed policy changes, policy-makers appeal to Western countries’ practices of differentiation, integration and individualisation in education. For example, there is a detailed description of specialised education in France followed by the cases of Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Argentina. References are also made to the practice of introducing elective subjects in the USA, England and Scotland. As a last example, the case of Russia is mentioned, which may have been put at the end of the list to signify that Russia’s influence is minimal in today’s independent Ukraine. The example taken from the local practices dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century concludes the argument for introducing curriculum choice. By drawing on national and international experience, policy-makers aim to silence the possible objections to this policy.
However, the notion of ‘choice’ has a particular meaning in post-communist Ukraine. The proposed policy does not in fact allow students to choose their area of specialisation, in line with the ‘technologies of the self’ argument, as this will be done through ‘technologies of domination’ on the part of the Ministry and schools. This raises questions about the flexibility of specialised education, and the opportunity to move from one specialisation to another.

The linguistic devices employed in No. 428/55 include argumentation, advocacy and informative approaches. There are no signs of the command-administrative style evident in the other two policy texts analysed above. No. 428/55 was constructed with the aim of generating a ‘discussion’ on the suggested policy changes, but the time allocated for possible feedback to policy is extremely limited, in fact less than a month. Regardless of the present inner contradictions, this document signifies some gradual if limited shifts in policy-making towards involving the wider educational community in the discussion of education policy. The non-specialist community outside education, however, is excluded from the discussion and consequently from the opportunity to have any kind of influence on the construction of education policies. Nowhere in the text can a reader find references to parents, business people or employers, yet the link between education and employment is stated.

Thus, the analysis of the The letter on discussing the draft of the concept of specialised education in upper secondary schools (2003) illustrates that this policy text is a hallmark of certain significant if tentative developments in policy-making towards the greater engagement of the educational community in the policy consultation process. However, this policy document is an exception rather than a definite departure from existing Soviet-style practices.

### Table 3. The structure of specialised education at upper secondary school level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main areas of specialisation</th>
<th>Social sciences/humanities</th>
<th>Sciences</th>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>Applied and performing arts</th>
<th>Sport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation:</td>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>Computer science</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Athletics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Gymnastics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Biology</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Theatre studies</td>
<td>Swimming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Agricultural technology</td>
<td>Choreography</td>
<td>Swimming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Jurisprudence</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Computer science</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Hiking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecology</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Hiking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

This paper discussed the implications of Foucault’s governmentality concept towards understanding policy-making in post-communist Ukraine. Emerging governmentality as a conceptual tool moves away from a ‘transitology’ approach, which equates post-communist developments with those that took place in Western states. Instead the concept of emerging governmentality emphasises the unique and distinctive nature of post-communist transformation as it offers an understanding of the inner contradictions upon which the emerging governmental rationality of post-communism is building. Similarly, this concept captures both continuity and discontinuity with the practices and discourses of the previous regime. The empirical part of this paper presented a discourse analysis of curriculum
choice and assessment policy documents (policies different in style, rhetoric and discursive repertoires) as examples of emerging governmentality. In the course of the analysis, several overarching and interlinked internal and external discourses were identified. The external overarching discourse of educational democratisation (with subsidiary elements of ‘choice’, ‘individualisation’ and ‘specialisation’) was embedded in the Ukrainian case in the discourse of educational renewal, initiated and controlled by the government. The second external discourse is the global discourse of economic competitiveness and competencies, which emerged in Ukrainian education in the form of competencies-based assessment policies, while the discourse of Europeanisation as a leitmotiv of the reform of upper secondary schools has been articulated as the specialised education discourse with prospects for curriculum choice. The findings of the discourse analysis of the first two policy documents suggest that educational policy-making in Ukraine is still highly centralised and monopolised by the government. This balance of power is maintained and reinforced by a range of socio-political and economic factors and the state- and nation-building discourse. In particular, the government has monopolised the state-building policy initiatives, while on the level of society the lack of politically active citizens, apathy and social exclusion constrain public involvement in the policy process. The Ukrainian government in its turn is exposed to the pressure of external discourses, towards which it shows greater openness, recognising external advice as sites of expertise, an important element of emerging governmentality.

However, the analysis of the third policy document demonstrates that there are certain limited changes in the balance of power of educational policy-making in Ukraine. Although the system of policy-making is centralised and hierarchical in its nature, it shows some acknowledgement, albeit so far largely rhetorical, of greater external influences in the form of new discourses of globalisation, competencies, assessment and curriculum choice (exercised by schools rather than students). The discourse of competencies was mediated and used by Ukrainian policy-makers to fill in the ‘old’ and ‘empty’ Soviet educational discourses, such as collectivism, class antagonism, and the like, with the new post-independent (democratised and individualised) discourses via borrowed rhetoric, terminology and ‘regimes of truth’. In conclusion, the interplay of policy discourses and the internal and external influences embedded in them demonstrate that today Ukrainian education has a more distinctly European character rather than Russian.

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Notes

2. For a detailed discussion on ‘Using governmentality as a conceptual tool in education policy research’, see Fimyar (2008).

3. In further developing the conceptual framework for my research, I partly draw on Silova’s work (2002, 309), which moves away from theories which define the impact of globalisation on education primarily in terms of harmonisation, whether it be voluntary or imposed. Instead, I use the concept of ‘travelling policy’ (Alexiadou and Jones 2001; Seddon 2005) or ‘policy borrowing’ (Ball 2003, 2006; Ozga and Jones 2006) as a lens to capture globalisation processes in education.

4. The Ukrainian-Russian language policies are still a very ‘sensitive’ issue, which in time of elections is tactically threaded into the electoral programmes of political candidates. Most often, these are populist declarations to make the Russian language the second official language in Ukraine, which is de facto the language of communication of over 50% of the population in the country. These declarations provoke disagreement in Western and Central Ukraine and found support and approval in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. However, these intentions have not yet informed policy changes on the national level aimed at reinstating Russian in the south and east of the country, the exception being the regional initiatives in the aftermath of the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper (cf. Arel 2005; Wilson 2005; Aslund and McFaul 2006).


6. In Ukraine, the school year starts on 1 September, which means the schools were to use the temporary evaluation criteria.

7. For more critique on competencies in education see Westera (2001, 75–88).

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